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THE  CONSTRUCTION  INDUSTRY  STABILIZATION  COMMITTEE was  estab- 
lished by  Executive Order 11588 on  March 29,  1971. It  is  a tripartite 
committee, with unions, management, and the public each having four 
representatives,  and with John T. Dunlop, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences of Harvard University, as chairman. The labor and management 
members have alternates-not  personal alternates from their own staffs, 
but officials of other unions and contractor associations having the same 
stature as the men they replace. Changes in the economic provisions of all 
new collective agreements in the construction industry require approval 
by the committee before they can be put into effect. Before most cases 
come to the committee they are first reviewed by one of a series of craft 
dispute boards representing branches of the industry. These have labor 
and management members, but no public members. Some agreements are 
disapproved by the craft boards before they reach the committee. 
By the end of  October 1971, the committee had received more than 
1,200 cases involving an even larger  number of agreements.  It had approved 
the economic adjustments in more than 700 cases and had failed to  ap- 
prove, in whole or in part, the economic adjustments in about 350 others. 
According to unofficial statistics, the unweighted average first-year in- 
crease in wages and fringe benefits in the cases approved is approximately 
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11 percent. For those contracts that include a second year, the average 
second-year increase approved is approximately 9 percent. For those with 
a third year, the average increase approved for it is approximately 8 per- 
cent. The average first-year increase on contracts negotiated in 1970 was 
15 percent, and settlements in the first quarter of 1971 ran above the 1970 
level. During 1970, the volume of expenditures for new construction was 
$91 billion; in the first seven months of 1971 it rose to an annual rate of 
$103 billion. To be sure, most  of the expansion was in residential con- 
struction; nevertheless, it added up to a very large increase in activity that, 
in  the  absence  of  controls,  would  no  doubt  have  led  to  higher wage 
settlements. 
The committee has had two other effects. First, there have been fewer 
strikes in construction in 1971 than in 1970; substantially fewer than half 
as many strikes have been in progress in each week of the construction 
season. This development in itself tends to lower construction costs and to 
bring projects to earlier completion. The reduction in the number of strikes 
occurs in part because the controls exist and in part because officers of 
national unions  and contractors' associations serving on the committee 
have taken a hand in settling some of the most difficult negotiations. 
Second, the committee has frequently disapproved, often by unanimous 
action, changes in work rules that add to costs, such as increases in pre- 
miums for "high" time and for the use of certain tools, travel and overtime 
pay, and increases in the required number of foremen. On the other hand, 
the committee has been more willing to  approve increases in base rates 
where such costly  premiums and practices were reduced or eliminated. 
This policy, which is somewhat analogous to productivity bargaining  under 
the British incomes policy of the late 1960s, is not reflected in the statistics 
and indeed makes the wage statistics look worse than they should. 
The criteria under which the  committee operated until October per- 
mitted acceptance of economic adjustments "supportable by productivity 
improvement and cost of living trends, but not in excess of the average of 
the median increases in wages and benefits over the life of the contract 
negotiated in major construction settlements in the period 1961 to 1968."' 
This limitation was intended to place a ceiling of 6 percent on adjustments 
that do not involve equity considerations. The criteria  further  provided that 
equity adjustments "may, where carefully identified, be considered over the 
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life of the contract to restore traditional relationships among crafts in a 
single locality and within the same craft in surrounding localities."2 
It is clear from the difference between the average settlements approved 
and the 6 percent basic guidepost that the committee has made heavy use 
of the  equity provisions. Some critics make it clear that they  expected 
closer adherence  to the 6 percent figure and that in their opinion the equity 
adjustments have gotten  out  of  hand.  Such critics may not  realize the 
extent to which the wage structure in construction had become distorted 
during the wage explosion of 1968-70. 
It is not unusual for the committee to get a case in which the wage rate 
for skilled carpenters in a particular city in March 1971 was $5.00 and the 
rate for unskilled laborers in the same city was $6.50 because the carpenters 
had last negotiated in 1968 while the laborers had negotiated in 1970. Nor 
was it unusual in such a case for the committee to approve an increase in 
wages for carpenters of $2.00 over a two-year period, which constituted an 
increase of almost 20 percent a year. Even in such an extreme case, how- 
ever, controls can have an effect. In their absence, the new contract might 
easily have called for an initial increase of  $2.00 an hour, with more to 
follow. To the extent that such gross inequities are corrected during the 
first year of controls, increases in subsequent years can be kept closer to 
the guidepost figures. 
In many cases the consideration of equity also involves the comparison 
of increases in newly negotiated contracts with deferred increases provided 
for in previously negotiated contracts. Executive Order 11588 gives the 
committee power to examine deferred increases to determine whether they 
are grossly inconsistent with the criteria established in the  order. It  is 
silent on the powers of the committee if it finds such a gross inconsistency. 
The majority of the committee took the view that deferred increases could 
be prevented from going into effect only by voluntary agreement, and no 
such agreement has yet been implemented. Clearly, if the new Pay Board 
establishes control  over deferred increases in  other industries, the  con- 
struction committee will want to reconsider this issue. It is far harder to 
take a tough position on deferred increases when only one industry is being 
stabilized than it is in the context of a broad stabilization program. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the committee's work begins when 
it fails to  approve a wage increase. It does not formally disapprove the 
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agreement, for this would set in motion  a cumbersome machinery that 
might be counterproductive.  Instead, it returns  the agreement  to the parties 
for renegotiation. The labor and industry members of the committee have 
often been instrumental in helping to  renegotiate agreements that  were 
initially unacceptable. This is particularly  difficult for the union members, 
who  must  tell  local  unions  that  they  cannot  have increases that  their 
employers are often anxious to pay. Yet this process has been so successful 
that in seven months of operation there has not been a single strike against 
a committee decision. 
Clearly, it is my view that the committee has been successful. I make this 
evaluation against the background of incomes policies in the United King- 
dom and Canada, where attempts to  use all-governmental machinery in 
dealing with similarly decentralized unions seem to  me to  have accom- 
plished little or nothing. On the other hand, this judgment clearly will not 
convince those  who  believe that  one  can  stop  a  galloping inflation by 
slamming on the brakes hard and hoping that all passengers have their 
seat belts fastened. 
Some economists have suggested recently that there is a problem for 
stabilization agencies in working with the Federal Mediation and Concilia- 
tion Service, whose primary  aim is to avoid work stoppages, not to restrain 
inflation. The Construction Industry Stabilization Committee has not had 
any problems in this area. It has not attempted to use the mediation service 
to implement its wage policies-one  does not ask the chaplain to man the 
artillery. However, a representative of the mediation service attends each 
meeting of the committee and is very useful both in keeping the committee 
informed about developments in the field and in keeping the parties to 
negotiations informed about the patterns of settlements being approved by 
the committee in particular areas. 
The conflict between wage stabilization and dispute settlement is not 
created by the mediation service; it is much more fundamental. If there 
were no mediation service, there would still be strong voices within the 
legislative and executive branches of government to urge that stabilization 
policy be breached in order to settle disputes that damage the economy or 
harm particular groups of producers or consumers. The professional in- 
terest of mediators in settling disputes is very weak when compared with 
these political forces. 
What, if any, are the implications of the construction industry experience 
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structure, is that a tripartite committee has considerable advantage over 
an all-government body in implementing its wage decisions, even though 
the decisions themselves may turn out to be somewhat more lenient. 
The second implication is more subtle. It is that the effective functioning 
of a tripartite board requires the public members to play something of a 
mediating role. They must convince the union and management members 
that they are fair-minded and open to persuasion. The committee is fortu- 
nate in having a chairman  who has the confidence of both sides. In contrast, 
the labor movement has clearly expressed its strong feeling that most of the 
public members of the new Pay Board are hostile to it. If the board is to 
survive, they wili have to come to feel that their suspicions are unfounded. 
A third lesson is that any general guidepost for compensation must be 
lower than the desired average increase so  as to  leave room  for equity 
adjustments. On  the  other hand,  probably no  other industry requires 
equity adjustments  as large as those in construction, because no other wage 
structure starts out in such a mess. I would guess that a spread of 2 percent- 
age points between the guidepost for cases not involving equity and the 
average increase approved would be generally sufficient, as compared with 
the spread of 5 percentage points in construction. 
Perhaps the most important lesson I would draw is that any control of 
collectively negotiated increases must involve case-by-case consideration 
of all agreements. General guideposts may suffice for salaries and for non- 
union wages and fringes. However, it would be fatal to take a Galbraithian 
view of collective bargaining and confine jurisdiction to, say, the 500 settle- 
ments  covering the  largest number of  workers. Whatever the  case  in 
product markets, it simply is not true in labor markets that the biggest 
unions are the strongest. Indeed, the opposite sometimes comes closer to 
the truth: A small union in a strategic position may be the most powerful 
of all. Moreover, the force of "orbits of coercive comparison," to use the 
apt phrase of Arthur M. Ross,3 means that a high settlement for twenty 
asbestos workers or ten tile setters could destabilize wages for ten thousand 
workers in a whole metropolitan area. I am sure that this situation is not 
confined to  construction. The labor movement can tolerate some  con- 
straint, particularly if it has a hand in administering it. What it cannot 
tolerate is a constraint that is not evenhanded-that  holds some back while 
others are free to leap ahead. 
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Perhaps I have not drawn the right conclusions from the construction 
experience, or perhaps those I have drawn are less applicable elsewhere 
than I believe. Even if they are correct, I have no hope that even the best 
control system that can be devised can survive indefinitely. At some point, 
it is certain to break down, either because it becomes lax or because it is 
successfully defied. The most difficult challenge is to  achieve changes in 
bargaining structure while controls are in effect that will improve wage 
determination after controls are lifted. For construction, these changes in 
part involve the consolidation of bargaining areas and the encouragement 
of multicraft agreements so as to reduce the leapfrogging that has plagued 
the industry. The committee has been willing to pay a price for such re- 
forms in considering wage increases. The analogous objectives elsewhere 
in the economy will have to be defined on an industry-by-industry  basis. 
Discussion 
Arthur Okun: The construction pay panel had a unique and very difficult 
problem, trying to stabilize a single industry in an otherwise laissez faire 
wage system. I have no desire to second guess its actions. But I do worry 
about the picture of the labor market that Albert Rees draws. It confirms 
my fears that we have been experiencing more of a wage-wage spiral than 
a wage-price spiral. 
In that world, as Rees depicts it, market conditions do not seem to have 
much determining  influence, at least in the short run. Wage explosions can 
occur for no obvious reason. Construction unions have monopoly power, 
to be sure, but they have had it for a long time, and that power should have 
been expected to show up in higher wage levels rather  than in much greater 
rates of wage increase in the last few years. We are led to the notion that 
wage rate wars can break out, much as gasoline price wars do. These seem 
to occur when craft unions deal with small employers, not only in construc- 
tion but also among printers, teamsters, and dockworkers. Perhaps it re- 
flects the absence of countervailing power on the management side, which 
would tend to moderate the settlements. 
The key element in this picture is that any union that gets an unusually 
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netism on the overall pattern of wages in the future. That in itself would 
produce an inflationary bias in the wage determination process. Rees' pic- 
ture may well depict a fact of life. But, if so, it is an unhappy fact that ought 
to be changed by institutional reform or by controls. It should not be digni- 
fied as "equity." I don't view it as equity that, when one chicken gets out of 
the coop, all the others have to be let out, too. 
The inequity and the anomaly occur when laborers leapfrog over a $5 
carpenters'  wage to get a $6.50 wage. The aim of a restraint program is to 
prevent that first round of leapfrog from taking place or to end the game as 
soon  as possible if it does occur. Consider a currently relevant example: 
Steel, aluminum, and other contracts in manufacturing signed before Au- 
gust 15 work out to nearly 10 percent a year. These industries bargained 
in a world of rapid inflation; if, in fact, inflation slows to 21/2  percent, the 
workers will get a windfall. Now if new union wage settlements are forced 
down to  51/2 percent, workers covered by them will get a respectable 3 
percent rise in real wages. They will not get the windfall the steelworkers 
got, to be sure; but they will not be squeezed. I see no economic or moral 
case for an "equity adjustment" in such instances, even if history demon- 
strates that several settlements taking place after November 15 have reg- 
ularly matched the steel settlement in past wage rounds. Indeed, if "equity 
adjustments" are used to  rationalize large wage increases in the  union 
sector, the 51/2  percent limit will break down in the unorganized sector, 
because those employers have to maintain the good will of their workers 
by treating them as well as workers in the union sector are treated. 
Having said all this, I must recognize the real-world relevance of Rees' 
warnings. If the wage rate target is set too low, if the controllers try too 
hard, if they make no exceptions, the whole system may explode. The wage 
controls must look equitable enough to convince most people that the Pay 
Board is fair. But they also must be tough enough to  yield progressive 
deceleration of inflation. 
General Discussion 
Paul Samuelson reported two reasons he had heard that would account 
for a recent increase in the monopoly power of construction unions and 
hence for their escalating rates of wage increase: First, the mix of construc- 
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leverage. Second, no employer has successfully taken a construction strike 
in recent years, and employers have learned through bitter experience that 
it is disastrous to take a strike. Apparently, one key reason is that any con- 
struction worker with an automobile can hunt work in a nearby area when 
a strike shuts down building in his city. 
Charles Holt referred to Rees' observation that the most difficult chal- 
lenge is to effectuate changes in bargaining structure while controls are in 
effect that will improve the wage determination process after controls are 
lifted. For construction, this task means the consolidation of bargaining 
areas and the encouragement of multicraft agreements  so as to reduce wage 
rate leapfrogging. He asked how far Rees was willing to extend this prin- 
ciple. In Sweden and some other countries, collective bargaining is con- 
ducted essentially at the national level for all industries and occupations. 
Rees  responded that  he  wished to  push the  principle far enough to 
equalize the strength of the employers so that union victories in strikes are 
not automatic. That desire stopped far short of the Swedish pattern, which 
is alien to the bargaining conditions in the United States. In response to 
Okun's discussion of equity, Rees said that the comparisons that have to 
be taken seriously reflect traditional close relationships, similar to the fact 
that assistant professors are not paid more than associate professors. Two 
people doing essentially the same job, one working in a basic steel plant 
and one working in a steel fabricating plant, would consider it inequitable 
to have different  wage rates. That type of inequity can be handled either by 
rolling back the basic steel settlement or by letting the fabricators move up 
in line. The former course seemed impracticable, and hence, he felt that 
the Pay Board would be obliged to allow a catch-up, even though the fabri- 
cators' contracts come up during the control period. 
Peter Henle mentioned other aspects of the structure of bargaining that 
can affect the relative strength of unions and employers. In construction, 
local bargaining clearly helps the union side. The local union is stronger 
than the local group of employers, and furthermore the various locals of 
the same union tend to compete to  outdo one another in the size of the 
settlements. These elements are absent in large manufacturing industries 
such as steel and autos. An element on the employers' side in large manu- 
facturing units is that union strike funds would be rapidly depleted in the 
event of a large strike. Lawrence Krause mentioned the Davis-Bacon act 
as one unique feature that increased the bargaining power of  unions in 
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Several participants commented on Rees' estimate that  an additional 
2 percentage points of wage increase had to be allowed for equity adjust- 
ments. Fellner pointed out that an increase in the economy-wide average 
of wage increases by 2 percentage points as the result of the equity adjust- 
ments must mean that Rees expects them to  be extremely large in some 
instances. Rees pointed out that, in the construction case, some increases 
as large as 20 percent seemed justified on equity grounds. Okun was con- 
cerned that  adjustments of  this  size  in the  collective bargaining sector 
would be discriminatory relative to unorganized workers, who would be 
basically governed by the 51/2  percent guideline and whose pay decisions 
would not be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the Pay Board. Samuel- 
son believed that large increases in the union sector would create upward 
pressures on nonunion employers who set those wages in such a way as to 
eliminate  any  appeal  of  unionization  to  unorganized workers. It  was 
pointed out, on the other hand, that average nonunion wage increases have 
been considerably below union increases of late, reversing an earlier pat- 
tern; if this situation has been viable in an uncontrolled economy, it may 
continue to be viable. 